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Abstract
It is often shown that temporary employees generally perceive their job insecurity to be higher than
permanent employees. However, substantial variations in this perceived job security gap exist
between countries. This article engages with this knowledge and adds to it by focusing on these coun-
try variations and asking what role the strength of employment protection legislation (EPL) has both
on the size of the job security gap and in explaining country differences. The developed hypotheses
suggest that the two components of EPL—job security provisions, indicating the ‘protection gap’ be-
tween permanent and temporary employees as well as specific regulations on the use of temporary
contracts—will increase the job security gap. These hypotheses are tested using data from the
European Social Survey for 2004 and 2010 and data on employment regulations from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Compared to existing studies, this article
offers a more detailed look at the operationalization of job security provisions and regulations on tem-
porary employment—proposing an alternative measurement which is more closely related to the the-
oretical arguments. By using this more elaborate operationalization, the multilevel model shows that
the gap in perceived job security between temporary and permanent employees systematically in-
creases with respect to the two components of EPL.
Introduction
Over the past decades, most European countries, faced
with a growing demand for more flexibility, introduced
so-called ‘partial’ or ‘targeted reforms’ that loosened
regulations on the use of temporary contracts while still
leaving job security provisions for permanent workers
largely untouched (Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005).
These reforms made it easier for employers to increase
the flexibility of their workforce by using fixed-term
contracts (FTCs). This resulted in increasing numbers of
temporary employees in Europe, which has created
‘flexibility at the margin’ (Sala et al., 2012).
This study evaluates the consequences of these tem-
porary contracts on perceived job insecurity and the
moderating role of the two different components of em-
ployment protection legislation (EPL): job security pro-
visions and regulations on temporary contracts.
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Employees with temporary contracts face a higher
probability of becoming unemployed (OECD, 2006),
even after taking a number of observable (Giesecke and
Groß, 2003) and unobservable factors into account
(Gash and McGinnity, 2007). Consequently, these em-
ployees report higher subjective job insecurity levels
than permanent workers (Anderson and Pontusson,
2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012). In
this study, subjective job insecurity refers to the cogni-
tive evaluation that the current job will be lost involun-
tarily (for more details, see Anderson and Pontusson,
2007; Dixon et al., 2013).
This gap in subjective job insecurity is an essential di-
mension of social inequality, since its negative effects ex-
tend far beyond work into various other domains of life.
Employees who perceive their job to be insecure report
lower job satisfaction (De Witte and Na¨swall, 2003;
Sverke et al., 2002); suffer from decreased psychological
and physical health (Buffel et al., 2015; De Witte et al.,
2015) as well as lower well-being and life satisfaction
(Carr and Chung, 2014; De Cuyper and De Witte,
2007); they also display differences in life planning, espe-
cially with respect to delaying long-term commitments,
such as having children, getting married, or buying a
house (Lozza et al., 2013). Since these negative conse-
quences are not caused by objective job insecurity—such
as temporary employment itself—but by perceived job
insecurity (Golsch, 2003), knowledge about the percep-
tions of these FTCs on job insecurity is essential for
understanding how strongly temporary employees are
disadvantaged compared to permanent employees.
Although numerous studies have found a gap in per-
ceived job insecurity between permanent and temporary
employees (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007;
Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012), knowledge
about differences across countries is sparse (Chung and
Mau, 2014: 312). Since the implications of temporary
employment on the risk of job loss vary drastically
across countries due to the strong variations in EPL
(Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Centeno and Novo,
2012), the effect of temporary employment on perceived
job insecurity cannot be expected to be constant across
national contexts. In this case, the detrimental effect of
temporary employment on various areas of life would
also be expected to be much stronger in these countries.
The present study adds to current knowledge by ana-
lysing country differences in the size of the effect of tem-
porary versus permanent employment, and by
evaluating the role of job security provisions and regula-
tions on temporary contracts.
The following sections develop hypotheses about
how these two components of EPL influence the gap
between temporary and permanent employees with re-
spect to perceived job insecurity. The ‘Methods’ section
explains how these two components of EPL are
operationalized, since this study argues that the standard
approach of simply using the additive indices provided
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) is problematic, and the items
‘definition of unfair dismissals’ and the regulations on
temporary contracts (with respect to the maximum
number of successive temporary contract and the max-
imum cumulative duration of temporary employment)
are better suited for testing the hypotheses. Considerable
country-related variations are found in the perceived job
insecurity of permanent and temporary employees. The
multilevel model of the present study shows that both
components of EPL—job security provisions and regula-
tions on temporary contracts—increase the gap in per-
ceived job insecurity of temporary and permanent
employees. Finally, the implications of these findings are
discussed.
Empirical Findings and Theoretical
Considerations
Perceived Job Insecurity: Its Causes and Gaps in
the Literature
Subjective job insecurity is a multi-dimensional concept
(Chung and Mau, 2014: 305; for an overview, see
Anderson and Pontusson, 2007). Many scholars have
pointed to the importance of distinguishing between the
cognitive and affective aspects of job security (Anderson
and Pontusson, 2007; Na¨swall and De Witte, 2003).
The cognitive aspect—the perceived probability that the
current job will be involuntarily lost—will be concen-
trated on here. This perceived job insecurity is an em-
ployee’s subjective evaluation of his/her individual
resources and the institutional context with respect to
the likelihood of losing the current job. Factors influenc-
ing this assessment can be situated at the individual
level, the level of the firm, or the country level.
At the individual level, a temporary (compared to
permanent) contract is usually one of the factors that in-
creases job insecurity the most (Anderson and
Pontusson, 2007; Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008;
Esser and Olsen, 2012). Therefore, it is important to
understand the conditions for which this is the case.
Previous research has argued that perceived job inse-
curity stems from a relative lack of power (Dixon et al.,
2013: 1055). This approach matches with previous find-
ings concerning the individual level. Employees who
possess marketplace and workplace bargaining power
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(Wright, 2000), e.g. in the form of knowledge and skills
that are valuable to the company, experience less job in-
security (Green et al., 2000). This finding also can be ex-
pressed as a simple rational choice argument: as long as
a company expects the utility of keeping an employee to
be higher than dismissing her/him, his/her job will be
(and will be perceived to be) secure.
In addition to the individual characteristics of an em-
ployee, this rational choice calculation will also be influ-
enced by country-level characteristics. In particular, the
economic situation of a country and its labour legisla-
tion can be expected to influence decision-making. The
economic situation will impact the utility of keeping an
employee. Consistent with this, a high unemployment
rate has been found to increase perceived job insecurity
(Berglund, 2015; Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008;
Esser and Olsen, 2012). On the other hand, EPL deter-
mines the possibilities and costs of keeping and dismiss-
ing employees. Since rules for dismissal differ immensely
for permanent and temporary contracts, it seems evident
that employees would be affected differently. However,
studies looking in this direction have found only weak
evidence. We know that a high unemployment rate and
strict EPL reduce satisfaction regarding job security only
for temporary, not permanent, employees (Clark and
Postel-Vinay, 2009). Studies that have identified signifi-
cant effects on related questions (Berglund, 2015;
Chung and van Oorschot, 2011) do not include a ran-
dom slope for temporary employment in the multilevel
models, which however leads to a severe underestima-
tion of the confidence intervals. The results indicate that
the effect of temporary employment on job insecurity is
stronger in countries with strict EPL (Berglund, 2015)
and stronger on employment security in countries with
strict regulations on permanent employment (Chung
and van Oorschot, 2011). If the random slope is
included, however (using the same dataset), employment
regulations do not seem to explain differences in em-
ployment security between permanent and temporary
employees (Chung, 2016). Additionally, these studies
have a broader scope, concentrate more on the macro
level and do not concentrate on EPL. This study looks at
the connection more closely from a micro-level perspec-
tive and asks: Can EPL explain the effect heterogeneity
of having a temporary contract? Additionally, it is also
important to take a closer look at the measurement of
EPL when studying this connection. EPL incorporates
different dimensions. Recent research points to the im-
portance of differentiating between regulations on the
use of temporary contracts and job security provisions
for permanent contracts (Noelke, 2016). Additionally, it
is necessary to choose an operationalization more
closely related to the theoretical concepts than previous
studies have done. In the next two sections, hypotheses
are developed concerning how job security provisions
for permanent contracts and regulations on the use of
temporary contracts influence the gap between perman-
ent and temporary employees.
EPL, Job Security Provisions, and the Protection
Gap
Generally, EPL is often expected to increase job security,
since it limits companies’ ability to hire and fire at will;
however, in most studies, EPL is unrelated to perceived
job insecurity (Dixon et al., 2013; Erlinghagen, 2008;
Esser and Olsen, 2012); only one study has found that
EPL decreases job insecurity (Anderson and Pontusson,
2007). However, these studies suffer from two short-
comings: first, they do not distinguish between the ef-
fects of EPL on permanent and temporary employees,
and second, they use an index that includes both dimen-
sions of EPL—job security provision and regulations on
temporary contracts. The theoretical arguments, how-
ever, usually rely on the effect of job security provisions
in decreasing job insecurity, and the role of regulations
on the use of temporary contracts is neglected.
Therefore, it is important to look at both dimensions
separately.
Job security provisions reduce the permeability of the
barrier between work and unemployment (Clark and
Postel-Vinay, 2009). However, numerous labour market
theories, such as segmentation theory (Althausen and
Kalleberg, 1981), differentiate between groups within
the labour market, which could be affected differently.
Typically, temporary contracts are seen as an attribute
of the secondary labour market (Giesecke and Groß,
2003). The consensus among economists is that job
security provisions deepen the gap between the un-
employed and the employed. Additionally, these provi-
sions also should widen the gap between temporary and
permanent employees. In contrast to temporary con-
tracts, which have an expiration date, permanent con-
tracts are open ended. Therefore, if an employer wants
to dissolve an employment relationship, permanent em-
ployees have to be actively dismissed, while temporary
contracts expire if no action is taken.
For permanent employees, job security provisions
should increase perceived job security, since they in-
crease dismissal costs (Gebel and Giesecke, 2011;
OECD, 2013). The more difficult it is to dismiss em-
ployees, the less likely it is that they will lose their job
because it would be complicated and costly for the firm.
By increasing dismissal costs, job security provisions
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lower the threshold to which the utility of an employee
can decline before she/he is dismissed (Cahuc and
Zylberberg, 2004). These job security provisions for per-
manent employees can be interpreted as bargaining
power on the part of employees. If perceived job insecur-
ity stems from a lack of power (Dixon et al., 2013:
1055), job security provisions should decrease job inse-
curity for permanent workers. However, the situation is
entirely different for temporary employees. Since, by
definition, temporary contracts end automatically at a
set date without any further employer obligations, job
security provisions only protect temporary employees
during the length of their contract. Once their contract
ends, dismissal protection no longer applies and there-
fore can offer no protection. In contrast, if employers
want flexibility on the number of people they employ
and reduce their workforce, it is rational and the least
costly to let the fixed-term employees go, since the ex-
pected costs of dismissing permanent employees are
higher than not renewing the contracts of temporary em-
ployees. These predictions are based on the simple ra-
tional choice considerations of employers. If dismissal
costs at the end of a temporary contract equal zero, the
difference in dismissal costs between permanent and
temporary employees equals the job security provisions
for permanent employees. This difference constitutes the
‘protection gap’ between the two groups. Assuming, em-
ployees foresee these calculations made by the
employer—this leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The negative effect of temporary employ-
ment on perceived job security is stronger in countries
with substantial differences in the dismissal costs be-
tween temporary and permanent employees (strong job
security provisions).
Regulations on Temporary Contracts
Strict regulations on the use of temporary contracts are
designed to prevent employers from the excessive use of
these contracts that replace permanent jobs with tem-
porary jobs. The regulations define which kind of work
can be temporary and limit the number of successive
temporary contracts and the cumulative duration of one
employee with one employer. The last two aspects of
these rules may be problematic for employees holding
temporary contracts. If a successive temporary contract
is not possible, employers face the decision of whether
to transform the temporary contract into a permanent
one or let the employee go. Especially when job security
provisions are strong, transforming a temporary to a
permanent contract increases dismissal costs steeply.
Empirical evidence suggests that employers often prefer
to hire on a temporary basis for the same position and
replace the current temporary employee with a new one
if a successive temporary contract is no longer possible
(Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Centeno and Novo,
2012). Assuming that temporary employees recognize
these considerations of their employer, either because it
has been communicated to them or because they know
about similar cases, this leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The negative effect of temporary employ-
ment on perceived job security is stronger in countries
with strict regulations on temporary contracts.
Data, Methods, Measurements
The analyses in the present study are based on
individual-level data from Round 2 (2004) and Round 5
(2010) of the European Social Survey (ESS), both con-
taining the rotating module ‘Family, work and well-
being’ (ESS, 2010; for documentation of the data, see:
ESS, 2014). The ESS is a cross-national survey including
27 countries in 2010 and 25 countries in 2004.
These data sets are combined with country-level
data. Countries, for which no comparable country-level
data (for EPL) are available, are excluded from the ana-
lysis (for an overview, see Table A3). The sample used
here is restricted to employees between 15 and 67 years,
and the target population includes 29,639 employees
(2010: 17,370 in 22 countries; 2004: 12,269 employees
in 17 countries). List-wise deletion is used, so due to
missing data on the dependent and independent vari-
ables, 23,978 cases are available for analysis.
Outcome Variable
The dependent variable job insecurity is measured by
asking whether the statement ‘My job is secure’ is not at
all, a little, quite, or very true. Of the study’s sample, 14
per cent feel very insecure, 21 per cent a little insecure,
34 per cent hardly insecure, and 31 per cent not at all in-
secure. However, a considerable variation exists across
countries. Figure 1 shows the proportion of permanent
employees (solid bars) and the proportion of temporary
employees (grey bars) who report that their job is very
insecure. With only one exception, in all countries and
both years, temporary employees feel more insecure
than their permanent counterparts. However, the differ-
ences between the two groups vary considerably. The
numbers to the right of the grey bars are the ratio of
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how many temporary employees feel insecure compared
to their permanent counterparts.
In both 2004 and 2010, the largest ratio is found in
Spain, where temporary employees are eight to nine
times more likely than permanent employees to experi-
ence job insecurity.
Measurement of Job Security Provisions and
Regulations on Temporary Contracts
The country-level data for job security provisions and
regulations on temporary contracts measure the strict-
ness of legislation in place on 1 January 2004, and 2010,
respectively. These data are provided by the OECD
(OECD, 2016; for details on the methodology, see
OECD, 2013, 2014; Venn, 2009). The OECD provides
21 items, measuring different components of EPL that
are combined into three additive indices on the strictness
of EPL (for regular employment, temporary
employment, and collective dismissals). These general-
izations by construct indices have been used in previous
studies on related questions (Berglund, 2015; Chung,
2016; Chung and van Oorschot, 2011). However, since
they do not correspond very well to the theoretical argu-
ment set out here regarding the ‘protection gap’, the
items are looked at to operationalize and test the
hypotheses (see Table A1 for an overview of the items
and indices).
Job security provisions
Of the nine items measuring EPL (for regular employ-
ment), the best-suited item for measuring job security
provisions is definition of unfair dismissal, which is
measured on a scale from 0 (no regulation) to 6 (strict
regulation) and describes under which circumstances it
is possible to dismiss employees. If a dismissal is just, it
cannot be overturned by a court and therefore most
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Figure 1. Distribution of perceived job insecurity
Note: Percentage of people in each country who judge their job to be very insecure.
Source: Weighted results ESS 2004 (left) and ESS 2010 (right).
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accurately measures the legal protection gap. If worker
capability and the redundancy of the job are adequate
grounds for dismissal, all other factors should carry very
little weight for dismissal costs. Within the index ‘EPL
regular’ however, this item only carries a very small
weight. The other items (which constitute more than 90
per cent of the index) measure various aspects of dismis-
sal regulations but not protection against dismissal and
are therefore disregarded.
Two items measure the consequences of an unfair
dismissal. However, strong repercussions following un-
fair dismissal do not protect employees, if the threshold
in court, to consider a dismissal unfair, is extremely
high; in this case, definition of unfair dismissal assumes
the value 0.1 Another item—duration of trial period—
measures the time when the protection gap does not
exist but does not measure its size.
Two-thirds of the index ‘EPL regular’ consist of ‘pro-
cedural inconveniences’ and ‘notice periods and severance
pay’. Procedural inconveniences, such as notification and
consultation requirements, are inconvenient for the
employer but do not protect employees from losing their
job if a dismissal is defined as just. Notice periods and
severance pay (for just dismissals) impose dismissal costs;
however, in some countries, temporary employees also
are entitled to severance pay at the end of their contract,
so severance pay does not cause a protection gap between
permanent and temporary employees. Even though notice
periods delay dismissals, they do not prevent them.
Additionally, this indicator assumes its maximum (coded
with 6) at more than 3.5 months. This should not increase
dismissal costs noticeably.
In the present study sample, almost half the countries
are coded with 0, which means that regarding the defin-
ition of unfair dismissal, worker capability and the re-
dundancy of the job are adequate and sufficient reasons
for dismissal. In another large group, ‘a transfer and/or
retraining to adapt the worker to different work must be
attempted prior to dismissal’ is coded with 4 (see Table
A2 for the coding scheme; see Table A3 for country
characteristics).
Regulations on temporary contracts
The strictness of the regulations on temporary contracts
is measured by an additive index, which combines two
items (of the eight items measuring EPL for temporary
employees)—the maximum number of successive con-
tracts and the maximum cumulative duration (for more
details, see OECD, 2013; Venn, 2009). The two are
‘strategic substitutes’—independent strategies for coun-
tries to limit the use of temporary contracts of an
employee with one company.2 This independence also
shows in the correlation of the two dimensions (0.22),
so countries use one of the two strategies. These two
items make up only 25 per cent of the normally used
index ‘EPL temporary’. The other items measure various
aspects of temporary work regulations that are not
related to limitations of temporary contracts with one
company. One item indicates regulations on what type
of work is allowed to be temporary. This regulation pre-
vents employers from replacing permanent jobs with
temporary jobs and regulates entry into temporary em-
ployment, but it should not impact employees who hold
a temporary contract. Other items measure regulations
on temporary work agency employment, which is also
not related to the present argument.
Within this study’s sample, the strictness of the regu-
lations on temporary contracts ranges between 0 and 4.
As an additional robustness check, the two dimen-
sions of EPL regulations—job security provisions and
regulations on temporary contracts—are also combined
into three employment protection types, differentiating
between regulated labour markets, partially deregulated
labour markets, and flexible labour markets (see
Supplementary Appendix for discussion and results).
Control Variables
This study relies on previous research to identify the
variables to be included as controls in the multilevel
model. On the individual level, previous research has
found that company-specific human capital (Green
et al., 2000) (measured by tenure or training period) re-
duces job insecurity, whereas general human capital
(measured by years of education or educational degree)
is unrelated to job security (Green et al., 2000;
Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen, 2012) as long as
specific human capital is controlled for. Previous spells
of unemployment increase perceived job insecurity
(Chung and van Oorschot, 2011; Erlinghagen, 2008),
which indicates that past experiences can sensitize indi-
viduals. The results concerning gender, age, having chil-
dren, and part-time employment (Anderson and
Pontusson, 2007; Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008)
are inconclusive—most likely no effects or only small ef-
fects are attributable to these characteristics. However,
they are still included as controls. So, on the individual
level, general human capital, specific human capital,
age, part-time employment, sex, having a child, and un-
employment experiences are all included as controls.
At the company-level, perceived job insecurity has
been found to be lower in larger companies (Green
et al., 2000). Differences also seem to exist across
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different industries (Erlinghagen, 2008). Therefore,
company size and industry are included as controls.
To gain unbiased estimates of the security gap, all
macro-level variables that (i) have a causal effect on the
outcome variable (which is the size of the security gap)
and (ii) the independent variables of interest (job secur-
ity provisions and regulations on temporary contracts)
have to be controlled.
To identify factors that could influence the size of the
security gap, theoretical arguments are considered.
Additionally, factors that have so far been shown to in-
fluence perceived job insecurity are looked at more
closely. At the country level, previous research has found
little evidence for strong predictors—except for the un-
employment rate. It is possible that permanent and tem-
porary employees might be affected differently, as it is
more difficult to terminate permanent employees, com-
pared to not renewing FTCs. If an imbalance in labour
demand and supply exists, temporary employees are es-
pecially at risk of not having their contract renewed.
Therefore, both the main and the interaction effect of
the unemployment rate (the percentage of the labour
force aged 15–74 years who are currently unemployed but
actively seeking work), provided by the International
Labour Organization (ILO, 2015) are included as controls.
According to previous studies, factors such as aggre-
gated job stability, gross domestic product (GDP)
growth, social security (Erlinghagen, 2008), and un-
employment benefits (Esser and Olsen, 2012) are unre-
lated to perceived job insecurity. Although some
indications exist that union density and part-time rate
decrease perceived job insecurity (Dixon et al., 2013;
Esser and Olsen, 2012), these results are quite sensitive
to the other indicators included in the study. Even if
they do not influence levels of job insecurity, they may
still influence the gap between permanent and tempor-
ary employees with respect to job insecurity. However, a
strong argument for any of these or other factors has not
been made, or any evidence found. Therefore, they are
not included as controls.
The most likely of these factors to influence the per-
ceived security gap is GDP growth. It identifies the eco-
nomic climate and might influence insecurity mainly by
affecting unemployment. This factor however is already
controlled for more directly by including the unemploy-
ment rate.
Methods
Since the data are clustered in countries, a multilevel model
is estimated. To maximize the number of cases on the
macro level, the samples for 2004 and 2010 are pooled,
and country-years are used as the second level. To check
for robustness, however, the models are also calculated
separately for both years (see Supplementary Appendix).
Although job insecurity is only measured on a four-
point answering scale, a linear multilevel model is used,
since the focus of the study is on interaction effects and
ordinal models make interaction terms extremely difficult
to present and interpret. In contrast to the commonly
used binary model, this approach does not discard infor-
mation. To check for robustness, results from the linear
model were compared with the ordinal results (see
Supplementary Appendix). The latter pointed in the same
direction and led to the same conclusions.
Results
At first, empty models are estimated without any covari-
ates. In total, 13.9 per cent of the total variance of job
insecurity is due to country-year-level variability, which
is a sizeable portion (Raudenbush and Sampson, 1999).
In Model 1, only the individual- and company-level con-
trols and the main effects of the country-level vari-
ables—job security provisions, regulations on temporary
employment, and the unemployment rate—are included,
replicating findings of previous research. Model 2 add-
itionally includes the interaction terms to evaluate which
factors can explain the variations in the gap in perceived
job security between permanent and temporary em-
ployees. For both models, a random slope is included for
the effect of temporary employment, to see whether ef-
fect heterogeneity is present and needed explaining, and
if so, what proportion can be explained by the cross-
level interactions that are introduced.
The Model 1 results (without cross-level interactions)
showed that temporary employees feel considerably
more insecure than permanent employees, which con-
firms the results of previous research (Anderson and
Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen,
2012). The variance of the slope of temporary employ-
ment is significant, indicating that effect heterogeneity
exists that needs to be explained. This model finds that
the main effects of both components of EPL—job secur-
ity provisions and regulations of temporary
employment—do not significantly influence perceived
job insecurity, which is also in line with previous find-
ings (Dixon et al., 2013; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and
Olsen, 2012). Also reflecting previous findings
(Berglund, 2015; Green et al., 2000; Erlinghagen, 2008;
Esser and Olsen, 2012), the unemployment rate signifi-
cantly increases perceived job insecurity. In Model 2 the
interaction terms are included. The results show that the
gap in the perceived job insecurity of temporary and
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permanent employees significantly increases with job se-
curity provisions and regulations on temporary contracts.
Evidently, temporary employees feel more insecure
compared to permanent employees when job security
provisions are strong, possibly because they perceive the
difference in contractual power between themselves and
permanent employees, which confirms Hypothesis 1.
Temporary employees also experience more job insecur-
ity compared to permanent employees when regulations
on temporary contracts are strict, which confirms
Hypothesis 2. One possible explanation is that temporary
employees anticipate that employers would rather dismiss
them than make their contract permanent when a succes-
sive temporary contract is no longer possible. In total, 23
per cent of the variance of the random slope can be ex-
plained by the cross-level interaction terms. These rela-
tionships (and especially their size) can best be shown by
conditional effect plots (Figure 2). Job security provisions
and regulations on the use of temporary contracts vary
between their empirical minimum and maximum, re-
spectively. The solid line indicates the predicted effect of
temporary employment on perceived job insecurity, and
the grey area the 95 per cent confidence interval.
With respect to the strictness of job security provi-
sions (which varies in the present study sample between
0 and 5), the gap increases from 0.42 to 0.67. With re-
spect to the regulations on temporary contracts, the gap
increases from 0.35 to 0.73.
These effects are quite strong considering that the de-
pendent variable is only scaled from 1 to 4.
The outcomes from the model using employment
protection types, which are used as a robustness check
(see Supplementary Appendix), confirm the results. The
temporary contract penalty is largest in regulated labour
markets and smallest in flexible labour markets; in par-
tially deregulated labour markets, the size is in between
(see Supplementary Appendix for country characteris-
tics, complete results and discussion).
Table 1. Results of the multilevel analysis
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.524** (0.048) 0.211 (0.137)
Country variables
Job security provisions 0.004 (0.024) 0.037 (0.028)
Regulations on temporary employment 0.005 (0.051) 0.059 (0.059)
Unemployment rate 0.023* (0.012) 0.023† (0.014)
Cross-level interactions
FTC*job security provisions 0.050* (0.021)
FTC*regulations on temporary employment 0.096* (0.045)
FTC*unemployment rate 0.001 (0.010)
Individual- and company-level controls are included
Constant 1.713** (0.163) 1.917** (0.184)
Variance components
FTC (random slope) 0.073 (0.020) 0.057 (0.017)
Country 0.127 (0.032) 0.120 (0.030)
Covariance (FTC, constant) 0.057 (0.021) 0.045 (0.020)
Individual 0.830 (0.008) 0.830 (0.008)
Explained variances
Explained variance of random slopea – 0.227
R2 (individual)b 0.107 0.110
R2 (country)b 0.229 0.230
M 39 39
N 23,978 23,978
Note: †P<0.10, *P<0.05, **P<0.01; standard errors in parentheses.
All individual- and company-level controls are included. For complete results, see Appendix A5.
aReduction in variance¼ (var(FTC)M1  var(FTC)M1)/var(FTC)M1.
bR-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350–54); also see Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99–105).
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (restricted maximum likelihood); ESS 2004 and ESS 2010.
2004: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GB, GR, IS, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK, TR.
2010: BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IL, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK.
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When looking at the control variables, it is clear that
the unemployment rate is not related to the job insecur-
ity gap—it increases insecurity for both temporary and
permanent employees. However, there might be a three-
way interaction: the unemployment rate will increase
the security gap only if job security provisions are
strong. Unfortunately, there are not enough cases avail-
able at the macro level to test this.
Individual variables confirm the results from previ-
ous research. In particular, firm-specific human capital
decreases perceived job insecurity, whereas previous un-
employment experiences increase it (see Table A5 for a
complete regression table).
Multilevel modelling is problematic with a data set
including only 39 cases on the macro level, if one is inter-
ested in cross-level interactions. As a rule of thumb, usually
50 cases are required on Level 2 if the interest is in inter-
action effects (Hox, 2010). Here a restricted maximum
likelihood estimation is used, which is much more conser-
vative and realistic than a full maximum likelihood estima-
tion. Even though the results are unbiased, the estimates
can be rather uncertain (Bryan and Jenkins 2016: 7). The
model pooling the two data sets (using 39 country-years),
however, yields fairly stable results. When estimating the
models separately for each year, the effects are still found
but are very uncertain (see Supplementary Appendix).
To check for robustness, the DFBETAs are calculated
on the country-year level, for both interaction effects, by
alternately dropping country-years and re-estimating the
model (see Table A6). There are quite a few influential
cases. The interaction effect of temporary employment
and job security provisions varies between 0.043 (with-
out Spain 2010) and 0.059 (without Belgium 2004). The
interaction effect of temporary employment and regula-
tion of temporary employment is estimated between
0.074 (without the Czech Republic 2004) and 0.112
(without Denmark 2004). Since there is no random sam-
ple on the macro level, this constitutes a rough estima-
tion of the credible intervals using a different approach
than the confidence intervals.
Additionally, a two-step model is estimated, fitting
separate linear regressions on job insecurity in each
country-year (including the individual and company
level controls) and plotting the effects of temporary em-
ployment from these 39 ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gressions against job security provisions and regulation
on temporary employment, respectively (Figure 3).
The graphs can identify influential countries and show
the distributions of both the independent variables and the
effect of temporary contracts in the different countries.
These diagnostics help to clarify the reliability of the
findings. Even though the effects are quite robust, the
size of the effects should be interpreted with caution.
The sample of countries is not a random sample, and
there are influential observations, which strongly influ-
ence the estimates. If these countries were excluded, the
estimates would change noticeably. Even though pool-
ing the 2 years helps increase the sample size, the confi-
dence intervals and also the credible range of the
interaction effects (as indicated by the estimates when
dropping influential outliers) are quite large. Therefore
replication with other data would be desirable to further
narrow the size of the effect (see Replication Package).
Summary, Discussion, and Conclusion
The results indicate that in relation to perceived job inse-
curity, temporary employees feel more insecure about
their job than permanent employees, which is in line
with numerous previous findings (Anderson and
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Figure 2. Effect of temporary contracts on perceived job insecurity
Source: ESS 2004 and ESS 2010, based on estimation from Table 1, Model 2.
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Pontusson, 2007; Erlinghagen, 2008; Esser and Olsen,
2012). Additionally, the study finds that this perceived
job security gap varies strongly between countries. In
contrast to previous studies that have only found weak
or no evidence—either because the model does not in-
clude the random slope or because no significant effects
can be found—the study reveals that the gap between per-
manent and temporary employees regarding perceived job
security significantly increases with strong job security pro-
visions and strict regulations on temporary contracts. This
is probably due to two advances made in this study com-
pared to previous research. The operationalization of job
security provisions and regulations on temporary con-
tracts, using only the items that are closely related to the
theoretical arguments, measure the intended concepts
more effectively. Additionally, increasing the number of
cases on the macro level by analysing two data sets (ESS
2004 and ESS 2010) yields more exact estimates compared
to studies that only use one (usually with fewer than 20
cases on the country level).
This means that the effect of temporary employment
is much more pronounced when both components of
EPL are strong. These results highlight the need to take
country differences regarding the nature of temporary
contracts into account when investigating the effects of
these contracts on various outcomes (e.g. health, stress,
fertility decisions, etc.), since for these outcomes the
causal chain includes perceived job insecurity.
To evaluate the implications of this finding, one should
keep in mind that the share of temporary workers is posi-
tively correlated with job security provisions, since these
provisions increase the incentives to hire on a temporary
basis, which, in turn, increases the percentage of temporary
workers and the size of the ‘buffer stock’ (Polavieja, 2003).
Therefore, it can be expected that EPL will lead to a higher
segregation of the labour market, since both the detrimen-
tal effects of having a FTC and the share of employees af-
fected increase with job security provisions.
Additionally, research has shown that temporary
contracts are concentrated among young people (Gash
and McGinnity, 2007), which might have severe conse-
quences. Particularly at this stage of both entering the la-
bour market and transitioning into adulthood, a
significant number of important decisions—like having
children, marriage, and buying a house—will be made
that will be influential for decades to come. Therefore,
careful planning is of particular importance at this stage
(Hellevik and Settersten, 2013), but job insecurity limits
the capability to do so freely and effectively.
However, when looking at the distribution of risks
associated with the labour market, one should keep in
mind that job insecurity is only one aspect. If an em-
ployee expects to find a similar or better job immedi-
ately, the perspective of losing a current job is less
frightening (Berglund, 2015). These expectations are
also distributed very unequally; older employees in par-
ticular anticipate great difficulties in this regard (Green
et al., 2000). For this reason, an equal distribution of
job insecurity does not equate to an equal risk distribu-
tion concerning perceived labour market risks.
Considering the regulations on temporary contracts
(with respect to the cumulative duration of temporary
contracts and the number of temporary contracts), the
findings of the present study suggest that temporary em-
ployees would benefit from deregulation. However, if
these regulations were lifted, the potential for temporary
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Figure 3. Effect of temporary contracts on perceived job insecurity plotted against both dimensions of EPL
Note: Separate OLS regression were estimated within each country-year including all individual and company-level controls
Source: ESS 2004 and ESS 2010, author’s calculations.
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contracts becoming permanent seems even more unlikely,
since employers are never forced to make a decision.
The design of the present study has some limitations,
however. Concerning the validity of the effect—the study
looked at country differences concerning the effects of
temporary employment—depending on both components
of EPL—in a cross-sectional way. Therefore, causal infer-
ences are difficult to draw, since these models rest on
strong assumptions. Future research should, therefore,
look at perceptions of job insecurity in a longitudinal
study. Although some efforts have been made in this direc-
tion (Lu¨bke and Erlinghagen, 2014), a longitudinal re-
search design presents serious challenges: since EPL is quite
stable over time (OECD, 2004), there might not be enough
variation in the independent variable. Therefore, a design
that clearly identifies causal effects is quite difficult to oper-
ationalize due to the limitations of available data.
Notes
1 Alternatively, it also would make sense to com-
bine these consequences following unfair dismissal
and the probability of unfair dismissal in a
multiplicative index. When using this operational-
ization, the results were very similar (see
Supplementary Appendix).
2 To check this assumption, the two items are also
separately included in the models. Both items in-
fluence job insecurity similarly and can, therefore,
be combined (see Supplementary Appendix).
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.
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Appendix
Table A1. Strictness of EPL—items and summary indicator weights
Index
(Level 2)
Scale 0–6
Sub-index
(Level 3)
Scale 0–6
Item
(Level 4)
Scale 0–6
Weights
version
1 and 2
Weights
version 3
Individual dismissals—
(regular workers)
Procedural inconveni-
ences (1/3)
1. Notification procedures (1/2) (1/2)
2. Delay to start a notice (1/2) (1/2)
Notice and severance
pay for no-fault in-
dividual dismissals
(1/3)
3. Notice period after 9 months (1/7) (1/7)
4 years (1/7) (1/7)
20 years (1/7) (1/7)
4. Severance pay after 9 months (4/21) (4/21)
4 years (4/21) (4/21)
20 years (4/21) (4/21)
Difficulty of dismissal
(1/3)
5. Definition of unfair dismissal (1/4) (1/5)
6. Trial period (1/4) (1/5)
7. Compensation (1/4) (1/5)
8. Reinstatement (1/4) (1/5)
9. Maximum time for claim – (1/5)
Temporary contracts FTCs (1/2) 10. Valid cases for use of FTCs (1/2) (1/2)
11. Maximum number of successive contracts (1/4) (1/4)
12. Maximum cumulated duration (1/4) (1/4)
Temporary work
agency employment
(1/2)
13. Types of work for which is legal (1/2) (1/3)
14. Restrictions on number of renewals (1/4) (1/6)
15. Maximum cumulated duration (1/4) (1/6)
16. Authorization and reporting – (1/6)
17. Equal treatment – (1/6)
Source: OECD, 2014.
Table A2. Coding scheme EPL
Original unit and short description Assignment of numerical strictness scores
Assigned scores
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Definition of
justified or
unfair
dismissal
0 When worker capability or re-
dundancy of the job are ad-
equate and sufficient grounds
for dismissal
Scale (0–3)  2
1 When social considerations, age,
or job tenure must when pos-
sible influence the choice of
which worker(s) to dismiss
(continued)
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Table A2. Continued
Original unit and short description Assignment of numerical strictness scores
Assigned scores
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2 When a transfer and/or a retrain-
ing to adapt the worker to dif-
ferent work must be attempted
prior to dismissal
3 When worker capability cannot
be a ground for dismissal
Maximum number
of successive FTC
Number No limit 5 4 3 2 1.5 <1.5
Maximum cumulated
duration of
successive FTC
Months No limit 36 30 24 18 12 <12
Source: OECD, 2014.
Table A3. Country characteristics
Country Job security provisionsa Regulations on temporary employmenta Unemployment rateb
(2004) (2010) (2004) (2010) (2004) (2010)
AT 2 2.5 5.8
BE 0 0 2 2 8.5 8.3
BG – – –
CH – 0 – 2.5 – 4.5
CY – – –
CZ 4 0 0 1.5 8.2 7.3
DE 4 4 1.5 1.5 10.7 7.1
DK 0 0 3.5 3.5 5.5 7.5
EE – 4 – 2.5 – 16.7
ES 4 4 3 3 11.1 19.9
FI 4 4 2 2 10.4 8.4
FR 4 4 8.9
GB 0 0 0.5 0.5 4.6 7.8
GR 1 1 3 3 10.5 12.5
HR – – –
HU 0 0 2.5 2.5 5.8 11.2
IE – 0 – 0.5 – 13.9
IL 0 0 9.3 6.0
IS 0 0.5 4.0
LT – – –
LU – – –
NL 3 3 2 2 4.6 4.5
NO 5 5 2.5 3 4.3 3.5
PL 0 0 2 2 19.1 9.6
PT 5 5 1.5 1.5 6.3 10.8
RU 5 1 7.3
SE 4 4 3 1.5 6.7 8.6
SI – 4 – 1.5 – 7.2
SK 0 0 1.5 2.5 18.6 14.4
TR – – –
UA – – – – – –
Note: – included in the ESS, but EPL not available.
Source: aBased on OECD, 2014; bILO, 2015.
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Table A4. Descriptive statistics of the variables
Mean 2004 Mean 2010 Minimum Maximum
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.136 0.120 0 1
Education
ISCED 0–2 0.189 0.121 0 1
ISCED 3–4 0.486 0.477 0 1
ISCED 5–6 0.325 0.402 0 1
‘easy to replace’ (1–10) 6.141 (2.651) 5.840 (2.683) 0 10
Training period
<1 day 0.033 0.034 0 1
2–6 days 0.087 0.087 0 1
1–4 weeks 0.172 0.160 0 1
1–3 months 0.228 0.221 0 1
3 months to 1 year 0.281 0.283 0 1
1–2 years 0.118 0.128 0 1
2–5 years 0.064 0.067 0 1
More than 5 years 0.017 0.020 0 1
Age (years)
20–29 0.179 0.164 0 1
30–39 0.280 0.259 0 1
40–54 0.409 0.413 0 1
55–67 0.132 0.164 0 1
Part-time 0.149 0.164 0 1
Female 0.482 0.510 0 1
Child 0.516 0.515 0 1
Unemployed in past 5 years 0.122 0.111 0 1
Unemployed more than 12 months 0.093 0.090 0 1
Firm size
<10 0.221 0.208 0 1
10–24 0.209 0.191 0 1
25–99 0.271 0.267 0 1
100–499 0.180 0.188 0 1
>500 0.120 0.146 0 1
Industry
1 Agriculture 0.028 0.023 0 1
2 Manufacturing industry 0.183 0.172 0 1
3 Construction 0.062 0.060 0 1
4 Trade 0.115 0.111 0 1
5 Transport/infrastructure 0.077 0.115 0 1
6 Finance 0.036 0.036 0 1
7 Public administration 0.077 0.073 0 1
8 Education 0.110 0.105 0 1
9 Health sector 0.139 0.125 0 1
10 Service 0.174 0.180 0 1
Note: Only for cases included in the analysis. Standard deviations in brackets (not for dichotomous variables).
Source: ESS 2004; unweighted results; N¼10,029; ESS 2010; unweighted results; N¼ 13,949.
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Table A5. Complete results of the multilevel analysis
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Fixed-term contract (FTC) 0.524** (0.048) 0.211 (0.137)
Country variables
Job security provisions 0.004 (0.024) 0.037 (0.028)
Regulations on temporary employment 0.005 (0.051) 0.059 (0.059)
Unemployment rate 0.023* (0.012) 0.023† (0.014)
Cross-level interactions
FTC*job security provisions 0.050* (0.021)
FTC*regulations on temporary employment 0.096* (0.045)
FTC*unemployment rate 0.001 (0.010)
Individual controls
Education (reference: ISCED 0–2)
ISCED 3–4 0.016 (0.019) 0.016 (0.019)
ISCED 5–6 0.044* (0.021) 0.044* (0.021)
‘easy to replace’ 0.030** (0.002) 0.030** (0.002)
Training period (reference: <1 day)
2–6 days 0.028 (0.038) 0.029 (0.038)
1–4 weeks 0.010 (0.036) 0.010 (0.036)
1–3 months 0.024 (0.036) 0.024 (0.036)
3 months to 1 year 0.094** (0.036) 0.094** (0.036)
1–2 years 0.118** (0.038) 0.117** (0.038)
2–5 years 0.149** (0.041) 0.148** (0.041)
More than 5 years 0.124* (0.055) 0.124* (0.055)
Age (reference: 20–29 years)
30–39 0.129** (0.019) 0.129** (0.019)
40–54 0.143** (0.019) 0.143** (0.019)
55–67 0.043* (0.022) 0.044* (0.022)
Part-time 0.064** (0.018) 0.065** (0.018)
Female 0.032* (0.013) 0.032* (0.013)
Child 0.030* (0.013) 0.030* (0.013)
Unemployed in past 5 years 0.224** (0.021) 0.223** (0.021)
Unemployed more than 12 months 0.098** (0.022) 0.098** (0.022)
Company and industry controls
Firm size (reference: >10)
10–24 0.031* (0.019) 0.031† (0.019)
25–99 0.020 (0.018) 0.020 (0.018)
100–499 0.000 (0.020) 0.000 (0.020)
>500 0.021 (0.022) 0.020 (0.022)
Industry (reference: 10 Service)
1 Agriculture 0.033 (0.041) 0.033 (0.041)
2 Manufacturing industry 0.096** (0.021) 0.096** (0.021)
3 Construction 0.046 (0.029) 0.046 (0.029)
4 Trade 0.030 (0.023) 0.030 (0.023)
5 Transport/infrastructure 0.000 (0.024) 0.000 (0.024)
6 Finance 0.044 (0.035) 0.044 (0.035)
7 Public administration 0.256** (0.026) 0.255** (0.026)
8 Education 0.266** (0.024) 0.265** (0.024)
9 Health sector 0.217** (0.022) 0.217** (0.022)
Constant 1.713** (0.163) 1.917** (0.184)
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Table A5. Continued
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Variance components
FTC (random slope) 0.073 (0.020) 0.057 (0.017)
Country 0.127 (0.032) 0.120 (0.030)
Covariance (FTC, constant) 0.057 (0.021) 0.045 (0.020)
Individual 0.830 (0.008) 0.830 (0.008)
Explained variances
Explained variance of random slopea – 0.227
R2 (individual)b 0.107 0.110
R2 (country)b 0.229 0.230
M 39 39
N 23,978 23,978
Note: †P<0.10, *P<0.05, **P<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses.
aReduction in variance¼ (var(FTC)M1  var(FTC)M1)/var(FTC)M1.
bR-squared as proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994: 350–354); also see Snijders and Bosker (1999: 99–105).
Source: Estimations from the random intercept and random slope model (restricted maximum likelihood); ESS 2004 and 2010.
2004: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, GB, GR, IS, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK, TR.
2010: BE, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IL, NL, NO, PL, PT, RU, SE, SI, SK.
Table A6. Outlier analysis of the cross-level interaction effects
bFTC*job security
provisions
bFTC*regulation on
temporary employment
DFBETAFTC*job
security provisions
DFBETAFTC*regulation
on temporary employment
All countries included 0.050 0.096
Model without
AT 2004 0.050 0.100 0.029 0.080
BE 2004 0.059 0.094 0.396 0.044
BE 2010 0.056 0.094 0.281 0.037
CH 2010 0.048 0.099 0.112 0.061
CZ 2004 0.055 0.074 0.243 0.482
CZ 2010 0.049 0.095 0.042 0.012
DE 2004 0.049 0.097 0.047 0.025
DE 2010 0.051 0.095 0.028 0.014
DK 2004 0.045 0.112 0.254 0.344
DK 2010 0.048 0.102 0.099 0.132
EE 2010 0.055 0.097 0.200 0.024
ES 2004 0.046 0.086 0.197 0.218
ES 2010 0.043 0.088 0.346 0.169
FI 2004 0.045 0.098 0.256 0.034
FI 2010 0.048 0.096 0.094 0.004
FR 2010 0.050 0.094 0.000 0.042
GB 2004 0.052 0.101 0.083 0.102
GB 2010 0.053 0.105 0.110 0.182
GR 2004 0.050 0.100 0.031 0.077
GR 2010 0.049 0.101 0.053 0.105
HU 2010 0.051 0.095 0.047 0.031
IE 2010 0.052 0.103 0.080 0.152
IL 2010 0.053 0.108 0.133 0.244
IS 2004 0.050 0.095 0.029 0.016
(continued)
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Table A6. Continued
bFTC*job security
provisions
bFTC*regulation on
temporary employment
DFBETAFTC*job
security provisions
DFBETAFTC*regulation
on temporary employment
NL 2004 0.051 0.097 0.043 0.019
NL 2010 0.051 0.097 0.041 0.020
NO 2004 0.051 0.096 0.026 0.004
NO 2010 0.050 0.096 0.001 0.004
PL 2004 0.050 0.096 0.006 0.002
PL 2010 0.048 0.097 0.101 0.015
PT 2004 0.045 0.101 0.232 0.105
PT 2010 0.057 0.090 0.304 0.142
RU 2010 0.057 0.084 0.322 0.267
SE 2004 0.048 0.089 0.101 0.165
SE 2010 0.046 0.102 0.206 0.136
SI 2010 0.053 0.092 0.131 0.092
SK 2004 0.045 0.085 0.235 0.253
SK 2010 0.046 0.100 0.191 0.101
TR 2004 0.053 0.093 0.115 0.065
Note: DFBETA¼ (b1b2)/s.e.(b2), where b1 is the original b (Table1, Model 2), and b2 is the b without the listed country. Critical values above 1/n (0.16) are
bold.
Source: ESS 2010, ESS 2004, own calculations.
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